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[795] 
Don’t Steal My Sunshine: Deconstructing the 
Flawed Presumption of Privacy for Unfiled 
Documents Exchanged During Discovery 
Mary Elizabeth Keaney* 
Courts encourage settlement as a way to resolve disputes efficiently and clear congested 
dockets, but settlement agreements can have a sinister effect too. It is becoming 
common in modern litigation to draft settlement agreements that require the return of 
discovery materials and the sealing of court documents from public view. Legitimate 
privacy concerns warrant sealing pretrial discovery and other court documents. 
However, the practice of keeping information vital to the public health and safety 
sealed for a price is illegitimate, and should be prohibited. 
Legislative efforts are being made to monitor the impact that secret settlement 
agreements have on public health and safety and to make the litigation process more 
transparent, but opponents have succeeded in blocking such legislation thus far. The 
primary objection raised by opponents to the Sunshine in Litigation Act and similar 
legislation is that there is a presumption of privacy for materials exchanged during 
pretrial discovery that is not filed with the court. Opponents rely upon a distinction 
between filed and unfiled discovery to support this presumption of privacy.  
This Note demonstrates that such a presumption has no place in the debate over this 
legislation, and relies on a close examination of the history of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (“FRCP”) for filing and discovery to unwrap the mistaken presumption 
advanced by the Judicial Conference and other opponents to the legislation. From the 
inception of the FRCP, there has been a public right of access to discovery materials, 
whether filed with the court or not. The advent of technology has resulted in 
voluminous document exchange in pretrial discovery. Any changes to the filing 
requirements were aimed at relieving the burden and expense associated with storing 
discovery information, and not intended to create a presumption of privacy for 
documents not filed with the courts. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011. Many thanks to 
my faculty advisor, Richard Zitrin, for sharing his expertise on this subject and his guidance in drafting 
this Note.  
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Introduction 
Many are familiar with the flurry of accidents resulting from 
separating tire treads on Bridgestone/Firestone tires in the 1990s. 
Accidents around the country resulted in serious injuries and fatalities to 
unsuspecting drivers, and ultimately, the company recalled over three 
million tires.1 What most do not know is that Bridgestone/Firestone 
settled hundreds of cases involving the dangerous tires, many with secret 
settlement agreements, well before the public learned of the danger the 
tires posed.2 If the court records from those settlement agreements had 
been available to the public, many lives might have been saved. 
The legislature can safeguard the public from experiencing a similar 
tragedy in the future by enacting the Sunshine in Litigation Act.3 The Act 
was prompted by stories like the Bridgestone/Firestone recall, and 
dozens of other cases involving hazards and threats to public health 
where court documents were sealed from the public.4 There are 
numerous cases where the practice of agreeing to seal settlement 
documents that would otherwise be available to the public may result in 
additional fatalities, serious injuries, and illnesses. Aimed at eliminating 
this public danger, the Act asks judges to consider public health and 
safety before granting a protective order or sealing court records and 
settlement agreements.5 Judges are given the discretion to grant or deny 
secrecy based on a balancing test that weighs the public’s interest in a 
potential public health and safety hazard against the parties’ legitimate 
interests in secrecy.6 
I.  The Judicial Conference’s Reports 
It might seem unlikely that legislation aimed at protecting the public 
in such a profound way would be met with rigorous dissent, but that is 
 
 1. Press Release, Bridgestone/Firestone Announces Voluntary Recall of 3.85 Million RADIAL 
ATX and RADIAL ATX II Tires, and 2.7 Million Wilderness AT Tires (Aug. 9, 2000), 
http://usgovinfo.about.com/blfirestone.htm; Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, Kohl Introduces Bill to 
Protect Public Safety in Secret Court Settlements (Mar. 5, 2009), http://kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/ 
pressrelease.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1464=2347 (reporting that over 250 people died in accidents 
related to the defective tires). 
 2. See Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, supra note 1. 
 3. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, S. 537, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 4. See S. Rep. No. 110-439, at 3–8 (2008) (listing numerous examples to show the impact of 
secret settlements on public health and safety, including Zomax, Zyprexa, Phenylpropanolamine 
(PPA), Bjork-Shiley heart valve, Dalkon Shield, silicone breast implants, Ephedra, ‘‘Park-to-Reverse’’ 
malfunction, side-saddle gas tanks, Cooper tires, all terrain vehicles, playground equipment, and 
portable cribs). 
 5. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, H.R. 1508, 111th Cong. § 1660 (2009). 
 6. Id. 
Keaney_62-HLJ-795 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2011 12:26 PM 
798 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:795 
precisely what has occurred. The most recent hurdle to passing the 
proposed legislation comes from the Judicial Conference. 
The Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009 was introduced to the House 
of Representatives in March of 2009.7 The Act presents a proposed 
amendment to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”) that is intended to “prohibit courts from shielding important 
health and safety information from the public as part of legal settlement 
agreements” and protective orders.8 Earlier in 2009, the Judicial 
Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and its 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules9 were asked to consider the 
suitability of the Act.10 The Judicial Conference Committees ultimately 
opposed the bill on the grounds that it effectively amends the FRCP 
without engaging in the rulemaking process.11 In addition to this 
procedure-based objection, the Judicial Conference Committees make 
three principal arguments in their opposition: First, the bill is 
unnecessary; second, it would impose an intolerable burden on the 
federal courts; and third, it would have significant adverse consequences 
on civil litigation, such as increasing cost and making it more difficult to 
protect important privacy interests.12 
 
 7. H.R. 1508, 111th Cong. (2009). Senator Herbert Kohl originally introduced the bill to the 
103rd Congress as “a bill to amend chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, relating to protective 
orders, sealing of cases, disclosures of discovery information in civil actions, and for other purposes.” 
Sunshine in Litigation Act of 1993, S. 1404, 103d Cong. (1993). It has been reintroduced annually since 
then, and while this Note was drafted, a revised version was before the House as H.R. 5419, the 
Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2010. H.R. 5419, 111th Cong. (2010). That bill was sponsored by 
Congressman Jerrold Nadler and represented an amended version of the Senate bill sponsored by 
Senator Kohl in 2009. See Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, S. 537, 111th Cong. (2009). The 
legislation was reintroduced to the 112th Congress by Congressman Nadler on February 9, 2011 as 
H.R. 592, the Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2011. H.R. 592, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 8. See Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, supra note 1. 
 9. When discussed together, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules will be called the “Judicial Conference 
Committees.” References to the Judicial Conference Committees are in the present context and refer 
to the body opposing the Sunshine in Litigation Act. When discussed separately, I use the “Advisory 
Committee” to refer to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in place at the time of the revision to 
FRCP. The “Advisory Committee” in this context has no view on the Sunshine legislation. See infra 
Part IV. 
 10. When considering the proposed Act, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure worked in tandem with its Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. See Sunshine in 
Litigation Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 55 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. 
Kravitz, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Conn.). 
 11. Id. For an explanation of the rulemaking process, visit The Rulemaking Process, U.S. Courts, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2011). 
 12. Hearing, supra note 10, at 56 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz). The Judicial 
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure first articulated these objections in a prior 
review of the legislation. See id. S. 5419 was amended to address some of the objections. Interview 
with Richard Zitrin, Lecturer in Law, Univ. of Cal. Hastings, in S.F., Cal. (Mar. 22, 2010). 
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The Judicial Conference Committees’ findings are not surprising. 
Numerous objections have been raised over the years to similar 
legislation. The principal objection espoused at the outset, and still relied 
upon today, is that an enhanced judicial responsibility to scrutinize 
protective orders and secret settlement agreements would burden an 
already overworked judiciary.13 Beyond considerations of judicial 
economy, opponents of the legislation also raise concerns about an 
undetermined threshold trigger for judicial oversight, a genuine need to 
protect trade secrets and other privacy considerations, lack of sufficient 
evidence to establish a widespread problem, and the chance that 
interference with party agreements will deter settlements.14 While some 
of these considerations have merit, others do not. When viewed in light 
of the larger principle that the courts have an overarching duty to protect 
the public interest, none of these considerations can overcome the need 
for implementing an enhanced scheme of judicial review for agreements 
implicating public health and safety.15 In fact, no single concern, or any of 
them collectively, adequately justifies the position that discovery 
materials are presumptively private. 
There is a longstanding debate in the legal community about the 
scope of this problem and the need to find a solution for it. Proponents 
of legislation regulating conditioned settlement agreements believe that 
the justice system is meant to protect the public interest as a whole, not 
just the individual litigants in a particular case.16 Advocates for more 
transparency in the settlement process believe that when genuine threats 
to public health and safety are implicated, secret settlement conditions 
cannot be tolerated, ever.17 Further, these advocates understand that 
while there are legitimate reasons to enter into an agreement that 
requires the substantive information learned during discovery to remain 
confidential,18 those reasons are not always implicated when the courts 
are sanctioning protective orders and sealing court documents. 
 
 13. Hearing, supra note 10, at 61; see also Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective 
Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 23–27 (1983); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective 
Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 487 (1991). The ABA also opposes 
enacting the legislation for similar reasons. See Independence of the Judiciary: Sunshine in Litigation 
Act, Am. Bar Ass’n, http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/sunshine/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 14. These historical objections will be discussed briefly infra Part III. 
 15. Some oppose even this basic premise that the court system is in place not only to resolve 
individual disputes, but also to serve the public interest at large. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 63 (“The 
reality of civil litigation is that it ordinarily serves to resolve private disputes.”). 
 16. See Richard Zitrin, The Judicial Function: Justice Between the Parties, or a Broader Public 
Interest?, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1565, 1568 (2004); see also Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the 
Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. Rev. 711, 715 
(2004); James E. Rooks, Jr., Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sunshine Chilly?, 55 S.C. L. Rev. 859, 875 
(2004). 
 17. Interview with Richard Zitrin, supra note 12. 
 18. Examples of legitimate reasons include protection of trade secrets and genuine privacy 
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This Note will demonstrate that those opposed to transparency in 
litigation have relied heavily on a mistaken assumption that is critical to 
the viability of their position. The notion that information exchanged 
during discovery is presumptively private is not supported by a close 
examination of the history and evolution of the rules governing 
discovery. If this mistaken assumption is brought to light, this Note may 
inspire opponents to Sunshine in Litigation legislation to reconsider their 
views. Even if opponents are not entirely persuaded to change camps, an 
accurate recount of the state of modern discovery is still relevant to the 
debate. 
II.  Road Map 
Part III of this Note will first examine the historical objections to 
this kind of legislation and briefly address the arguments for and against 
those objections. Part IV will focus on the current and leading opposition 
asserted by the Judicial Conference and includes an analysis of the 
history of the rules governing the filing of court documents and the 
applicability of Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart19 as primary support for the 
Judicial Conference Committees’ findings. Part V will suggest that this 
legislation properly targets the rules governing discovery, in particular, 
Rule 26(c) requests for protective orders. Part V also includes an analysis 
of the history of the rules governing discovery and the intended scope of 
the Act. 
A. Does the Public Have a Right to Access Discovery Materials? 
A threshold inquiry into this issue revolves around the public’s right 
to access information exchanged during pretrial litigation. Litigation 
takes place in a public forum. It primarily serves the purpose of resolving 
disputes between parties, but also encompasses a higher purpose of 
instilling confidence in the role of the judiciary as a protector of the 
public interest.20 Accordingly, the use of discovery in the name of 
accountability to the public at-large is in line with the scope of the 
judiciary’s role to protect the public interest. 
Even opponents to transparency in litigation concede that there are 
exceptions to a blanket prohibition of public access to unfiled discovery 
materials. One commentator contends that “any use of discovery 
materials except to prepare for trial is inappropriate.”21 However, the 
 
interests for minors. I will discuss this topic further infra Part III. 
 19. 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
 20. Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1568. 
 21. Marcus, supra note 13, at 7. Professor Marcus presents this statement in an article exploring 
protective orders and the public’s right to information obtained in discovery. See id. at 5. 
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same commentator also concedes that there are notable exceptions to 
this principle, including when 
(1) the information is needed as evidence in other litigation; (2) the 
information formed the basis of a pretrial ruling on the merits and 
access is necessary to permit evaluation of that ruling; or (3) in 
extremely rare cases, the subject of the litigation is alleged 
governmental misconduct, and there is a strong public interest in 
access.22 
These exceptions are often implicated in cases where the Sunshine 
legislation would prevent the sealing of discovery materials and easily fit 
into the underlying policy of protecting the public interest. Beyond the 
role of the judiciary as a protector of the public interest, the discussion 
that follows makes clear that the drafters of the Rules themselves 
contemplated a presumption of transparency in discovery. 
B. Privacy Rights in Discovery: The Mistaken Assumption 
Opponents to the legislation rely on a “longstanding recognition 
that while there is no public right of access to information exchanged 
between litigants in discovery, there is a presumptive public right of 
access to information that is filed in court and used in deciding cases”23 to 
explain the committee’s opposition to the Sunshine legislation. 
Opponents rely on this division between filed and unfiled information to 
justify the extension of greater privacy rights for information exchanged 
during litigation that is not filed with the court.24 This Note will 
demonstrate that such an extension is misplaced. Instead, the actual 
motivation for restricted discovery filing requirements in the Rules stems 
from attempts to curb undue expense in discovery and to address 
limitations related to storage capacity. In fact, the filing requirements 
have no connection to privacy rights of individual litigants. Privacy 
interests are addressed by the discovery rule governing protective 
orders.25 Therefore, any presumption of privacy in unfiled discovery is 
mistaken and does not represent an explicit policy choice to preserve 
privacy at the discovery stage. Rather, it is an unintended consequence of 
the amendments made to the rules governing filing requirements.26 
 
 22. Id. at 73. 
 23. Memorandum on Behalf of the Judicial Conference’s Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure & the Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Civil Procedure, Comments on Additional 
Language Proposed for H.R. 1508 (Nov. 2009) (on file with the Author) [hereinafter Comments on 
Additional Language Proposed for H.R. 1508]; see also Hearing, supra note 10, at 59–60 (prepared 
statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz) (recognizing a general rule that what is produced in discovery is 
not public information). 
 24. Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (at Last) That the Federal Rules Do Not 
Declare That Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 331, 354–55 (2006). 
 25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). 
 26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37. 
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III.  The Historical Debate over the Sunshine in Litigation Act 
Before addressing the current iteration of opposition to the 
Sunshine in Litigation Act in more detail, it is vital to understand the 
historical objections to transparency in pretrial litigation that remain part 
of the debate over this legislation. 
A. There Is No Widespread Problem Worthy of Judicial Reform 
From the outset, opponents to any form of secret settlement or 
protective order oversight have denied that a problem even exists.27 They 
argue that there is no empirical evidence showing that sealed settlements 
or stipulated protective orders are a problem warranting remedy. “[T]he 
number of cases that conceivably could contain information that has any 
bearing on public health or safety is minuscule compared to the corpus of 
litigation in this country.”28 This position was reinforced when the 
Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) released reports on protective orders 
and settlement agreements, in 1996 and 2004 respectively.29 The Advisory 
Committee had called for these studies in response to pending litigation 
and concerns over abuses involving protective orders and sealed 
settlements.30 
In the 1996 study, the FJC conducted research on protective orders 
and found that “there is no evidence that protective orders in fact create 
any significant problem in concealing information about public 
hazards . . . .”31 The FJC’s 2004 study addressed similar concerns related 
to abuses involving sealed settlement agreements filed in federal district 
courts and made similar findings. The study focused on how often and 
under what circumstances settlement agreements were sealed and found 
that secret settlements account for less than one half of one percent of 
cases, and that in those cases, generally “the only thing kept secret by the 
sealing of a settlement agreement is the amount of the settlement.”32 
Both studies have historically been cited by opponents to this kind of 
legislation to support the conclusion that, in light of the relatively small 
percentage of cases that implicate conditioned settlement agreements 
 
 27. Miller, supra note 13, at 432. 
 28. Id. at 477. 
 29. See Robert Timothy Reagan et al., Fed. Judicial Ctr., Sealed Settlement Agreements in 
Federal District Court (2004); Elizabeth C. Wiggins, et al., Fed. Judicial Ctr., Protective Order 
Activity in Three Federal Judicial Districts (1996). 
 30. Letter from Paul V. Niemeyer, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to Henry 
J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives 1–2 (Mar. 23, 1998) (on 
file with the Hastings Law Journal); see Hearing, supra note 10, at 63–64 (prepared statement of Hon. 
Mark R. Kravitz) (1996 report); id. at 66–67 (2004 report). 
 31. Letter from Paul V. Niemeyer, supra note 30, at 2; see also Wiggins et al., supra note 29, at 3 
(finding that protective orders occurred in five-to-ten percent of cases in the districts the FJC 
surveyed). 
 32. Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 8.  
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and protective orders, there is no need for legislation reforming the 
current practices.33 
Further scrutiny of the study itself easily defeats this argument. 
Because the settlement agreement study dealt only with filed 
agreements, the study overlooked a huge segment of cases relevant to 
this matter.34 As most settlement agreements are not filed with the court, 
any data from this study are incomplete at best.35 
Further, at least a dozen well-known examples of the true and 
dramatic implications of secret settlements on public health and safety 
can be cited to show there is indeed a problem worthy of examination.36 
While secret settlements may account for only a small fraction of cases, 
and admittedly, citing to a dozen cases does not necessarily justify a 
sweeping overhaul of current judicial procedure, these numbers are 
deceiving. 
The number of lives impacted in those named cases certainly 
justifies further exploration of this issue. In his tort reform article, Ross 
Cheit notes that at least one of the sealed settlement cases studied by the 
FJC concerned more than fifty claims and eighty-six victims.37 This 
observation illustrates that the impact of a single case can be widespread 
despite the misleading implication of the FJC’s statistical analysis.38 
The FJC also emphasized that in most sealed cases, the complaint is 
not sealed, giving the public access to party names and to the general 
allegations of wrongdoing.39 Access to the complaint alone is inadequate. 
Too often, complaints make only general allegations, and the details of 
the controversy come out only after some discovery.40 While the 
heightened pleading requirement for federal civil cases may alleviate this 
problem to a degree,41 it cannot be relied upon as the sole judicial 
 
 33. Hearing, supra note 10, at 67 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz). 
 34. Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 3. 
 35. Memorandum from the Am. Ass’n for Justice (Mar. 6, 2009) (on file with the Hastings Law 
Journal). The memorandum points out other flaws in the reports: 
First, when documents and settlements are sealed, often the fact that they were sealed is 
also sealed. As the FJC found, in some cases the entire case file, including complaint, was 
sealed with no explanation. Second, it was a very limited study that only looked at cases 
disposed of in 54 of the 94 judicial districts during a one-year period from 2000 to 2001. 
Id. 
 36. See S. Rep. No. 110-439, at 3–8 (2008). 
 37. Ross E. Cheit, Tort Litigation, Transparency, and the Public Interest, 13 Roger Williams U. 
L. Rev. 232, 243 n.47 (2008) (discussing the sexual abuse scandal that permeated so much of the 
Catholic church). 
 38. Id. at 241–42 (noting that the 2004 FJC study included a sample from just over half of the 
federal districts, fifty-two out of ninety-four, thereby weakening the strength of the analysis). 
 39. Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 8. 
 40. Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 586 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]n 
antitrust cases . . . ‘the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators[]’ . . . .” (quoting Hosp. 
Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 41. See id. at 556 (majority opinion) (holding that plaintiffs must include enough facts in their 
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mechanism to ensure public access to information relevant to public 
health and safety. 
B. Even If There Is a Problem, the Proposed Solution Infringes on 
Existing Rights 
Moving forward under the assumption that the scope of the problem 
is broad enough to warrant further consideration, opponents raise other 
hurdles to the successful implementation of a solution. One such hurdle 
is the notion that corporations have a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
their business operations and trade secrets.42 This is often the justification 
for issuing protective orders in products liability and tort cases43—as it 
should be when those interests are legitimate. However, those legitimate 
interests are not always implicated when protective orders and sealed 
settlement agreements are involved. 
Interests of public health and safety must trump any privacy interests 
of litigants, even when trade secrets are involved.44 “[T]here is no 
legitimate need to protect a product or service that hurts people. If it is a 
defective product, there is no trade secret to protect—no one is going to 
copy that design.”45 Requiring the courts to review protective orders and 
to balance the competing interests of the parties with the overall interest 
of the public at large is the proper approach in this regard. 
C. FRCP 26(c) Already Addresses the Problem 
Tangential to the privacy argument is the notion that Rule 26(c) 
already adequately addresses this issue. The argument is that “courts 
review motions for protective orders carefully and often deny or modify 
them to grant only the protection needed, recognizing the importance of 
public access to court filings.”46 Therefore, imposing more responsibility 
on the courts is unwarranted and cannot be justified in light of the 
increased costs, time, and burden. But what about stipulated protective 
orders, or when a motion is not carefully reviewed with an eye toward 
public health and safety implications? Stipulated orders save time and 
promote judicial efficiency. While the judiciary surely does not intend to 
 
complaints to make it plausible, not merely possible or conceivable, that they will be able to discover 
facts supporting their claims); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (holding that the 
Twombly test applies to all complaints, not only those in antitrust cases).  
 42. Miller, supra note 13, at 470. 
 43. See Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1590. 
 44. Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Court Rules Must Be Broadened, 55 S.C. L. 
Rev. 883, 887 (2004). 
 45. Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1590. 
 46. Sunshine Litigation Bill Unnecessary, The Third Branch (Sept. 1 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
News/TheThirdBranch/08-09-01/Sunshine_Litigation_Bill_Unnecessary.aspx; see also William A. 
Ruskin, When a Little Sunshine May Cause a Burn, Toxic Tort Litig. Blog, (Apr. 22, 2009, 11:03 
AM), http://www.toxictortlitigationblog.com/articles/sunshine-in-litigation-act-of/. 
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skimp when reviewing party motions, given the sheer volume of papers 
that pass through chambers, it is plausible that some party motions will 
be granted without first considering the impact on public health and 
safety. The Sunshine in Litigation Act addresses these gaps in existing 
procedure by putting public health and safety at the forefront when 
considering requests to seal information, stipulated or otherwise.47 
D. Considerations of Judicial Economy 
Finally, opponents to transparency point to an already 
overburdened judiciary and suggest that adding another time-consuming 
task will only exacerbate the problem.48 This is a legitimate concern. 
Some suggest private alternative dispute resolution as an alternative to 
litigation but acknowledge that there are significant adverse 
consequences to privatizing dispute resolution.49 Others find that the 
judiciary can accommodate this procedural change. Judge Joseph 
Anderson Jr., of the United States District Court for the District of 
South Carolina, is a principal actor in the effort to ban secret settlements 
all together and is not swayed by this proposition.50 In fact, Judge 
Anderson argues that transparency in discovery will foster judicial 
economy because parties litigating similar issues will not have to reinvent 
the wheel every time if they are granted access to discovery materials.51 
Further, once the legislation has been implemented by the courts, 
“workloads [will] return to normal as litigants learn of the futility of 
seeking improper protective orders—and the possibility of sanctions for 
requesting such orders in bad faith.”52 
Other popular objections include that more cases will be filed due to 
copycat litigation, that cases will not settle, or that cases will settle too 
quickly. These have all been addressed in other legal scholarship, and I 
will not reiterate those arguments here.53 The overarching point is that 
despite legitimate concerns about the courts’ capacity to implement the 
proposed legislation, such concerns cannot outweigh the courts’ critical 
function of protecting the public interest. An increased burden on the 
courts cannot quell the need for a solution when there are threats to 
public health and safety involved. 
 
 47. H.R. 1508, 111th Cong. § 1660 (2009). 
 48. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 49. See Cheit, supra note 37, at 281–83. 
 50. Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1582. 
 51. Anderson, supra note 16, at 743–46. 
 52. Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1591. 
 53. See generally Rooks, supra note 16, at 863–65 (describing arguments over secrecy in 
litigation). 
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IV.  The Current Debate over the Sunshine in Litigation Act 
While some of the arguments discussed above remain active in the 
debate over enacting the Sunshine in Litigation Act, an alternative focus 
has shifted toward privacy in the pretrial phases of litigation. 
A. Privacy Rights in Discovery: The Mistaken Assumption 
As mentioned earlier, opponents to the legislation mistakenly rely 
on a belief that there is no presumptive right of access to information 
that is filed in court to explain the Judicial Conference Committees’ 
opposition to the proposed legislation.54 Opponents use this misplaced 
division between filed and unfiled information to justify the extension of 
greater privacy rights to information exchanged during litigation that is 
not filed with the court. However, the true motivation for restricted 
discovery filing requirements can be found in a careful review of the 
revisions and amendments to the FRCP over the past several decades. 
1. A Brief History of Rule 5: Serving and Filing of Pleadings and 
Other Papers 
Rule 5 of the FRCP governs the serving and filing of pleadings and 
other papers with the court.55 According to Wright and Miller, as 
explained in Federal Practice and Procedure, Rule 5 serves two purposes: 
(1) ensuring the exchange of all written communication to all parties in 
the litigation, and (2) creating an “orderly court record for each case.”56 
Further, the treatise explains that changes to Rule 5 over the years have 
been a “response[] to advances in information technology[,] and . . . have 
sought to reduce the burdens on counsel and the courts.”57 
a. Early Amendments 
The 1970 amendments to the FRCP in general, and Rule 5 in 
particular, are central to this discussion. Before 1970, Rule 5 did not 
explicitly include discovery materials in the filing requirements, but 
instead made reference only to notices and demands.58 In 1970, the FRCP 
were amended to emphasize that the requirement included discovery 
materials, such as answers or responses pursuant to Rules 33, 34, and 36.59 
More precisely, Rule 5(a) was amended to include the filing of “every 
paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a party unless the 
 
 54. Comments on Additional Language Proposed for H.R. 1508, supra note 23; see also Hearing, 
supra note 10, at 59 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz) (recognizing a general rule that 
what is produced in discovery is not public information); discussion supra note 9. 
 55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5. 
 56. 4B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1141, 
at 411 (3d ed. 2002).  
 57. Id. § 1142, at 412. 
 58. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1970) advisory committee note; 12A Charles Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure app. c, at 125 (2010 Appendices). 
 59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1970) advisory committee note; 12A Wright et al., supra note 58. 
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court otherwise orders.”60 In fact, “Rule 5(d) is not intended to curtail 
any third-party access to pretrial discovery documents, but only to 
alleviate the courts’ ‘serious problems of storage.’”61 The change was in 
keeping with the original intent of the Rule: to ensure full exchange of 
information among parties and the court. 
Later, due to the changing nature of discovery in the modern era, a 
revision to Rule 5 restricted the filing requirement by allowing the lower 
courts “to order that discovery materials not be filed unless requested by 
the court or by the parties.”62 The Advisory Committee at the time 
explained that the “added expense and the large volume of discovery 
filings present[ed] serious problems of storage,” prompting the 1980 
amendment of the Rule.63 
However, change did not come easily. The first proposed revision, in 
1978, ignited controversy about the scope and necessity of this approach 
to solve problems related to expense and storage.64 In fact, this revision 
would have eliminated the requirement to file discovery materials not 
used in a proceeding.65 However, in light of the controversy, a 
compromise was reached. Because “such materials are sometimes of 
interest to those who may have no access to them except by a 
requirement of filing,” the 1980 amendment retained the filing 
requirement, while giving local courts discretion to authorize court 
orders that excuse filing if necessary in their district.66 The Advisory 
Committee explicitly stated that the change was directed at managing the 
expense and the associated burden that comes with modern litigation, 
not at denying public access.67 
Even with this tempered amendment in place, the 1980 amendment 
continued to fuel controversy. There was a great deal of concern with 
 
 60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a) (1970). 
 61. 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1152, at 462 n.5 (citing In re Consumers Power Co. 
Secs. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45, 50 (E.D. Mich. 1985)). But see United States v. Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d 85, 
91 (D. Conn. 1998) (finding that documents that play no role in performance of Article III functions, 
such as discovery documents passed between parties, are not presumed to be public). In Vazquez, the 
court referenced Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), but acknowledged an analogous 
contradictory proposition that “there is no presumptive first amendment public right of access.” 
Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (citing Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986)) 
(emphasis added). 
 62. 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1152, at 462. The 1970 revision anticipated the 
increased burden on the courts due to voluminous papers and numerous parties, and empowered the 
court to “vary the requirement if in a given case [the filing requirement] proves needlessly onerous.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1970) advisory committee note. 
 63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1980) advisory committee note. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
77 F.R.D. 613, 622 (1978); 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1142, at 417. 
 66. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1980) advisory committee note (emphasis added). 
 67. Am. Bar Ass’n, Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 
92 F.R.D. 137, app. at 156–57 (1980). 
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respect to the court’s newfound discretionary power to decide which 
materials must be filed and which need not.68 This discretionary role was 
in direct conflict with the traditional view that discovery materials were 
considered public documents, open to the public once filed with the 
courts.69 The prospect that some discovery might not be filed left open 
the possibility that information relevant to public health and safety could 
be shielded from public scrutiny. Some argued that orders waiving the 
filing requirement should be issued only when there was not a strong 
public interest involved, and that easing the discovery burden on the 
parties could not justify a filing waiver in such cases.70 The debate set off 
by the amendment initiated thousands of pages of legal scholarship on 
the topic71 and the issue remains unsettled today. 
b. Recent Amendments 
Further changes to Rule 5 filing requirements did not greatly affect 
public access to court documents until the most recent amendment in 
2000.72 After the 2000 amendments, Rule 5(d) read: 
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party, 
together with a certificate of service, must be filed with the court within 
a reasonable time after service, but disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) or 
(2) and the following discovery requests and responses must not be 
filed until they are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing: 
(i) depositions, (ii) interrogatories, (iii) requests for documents or to 
permit entry upon land, and (iv) requests for admission.73 
The amended rule adopted the more restrictive approach previously 
abandoned in the 1980 amendment.74 The rule now prohibits the filing of 
discovery materials unless it is used in a proceeding, or the court so 
orders. This new procedure results in a dramatic upheaval of the 
 
 68. 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1152, at 462 n.6 (“[A New York Times] article 
characterized the change as giving federal judges ‘the power to prevent public access to a huge number 
of documents that now belong to the record.’” (quoting Editorial, Paper Justice, N.Y. Times, July 22, 
1982, at A18)); see also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978) (“As a general 
proposition, pretrial discovery must take place in the public unless compelling reasons exist for 
denying the public access to the proceedings.”). Grady acknowledged that there is a split among the 
courts on the propriety of modifying protective orders to allow access to a nonparty, but ultimately 
allowed the discovery to be shared to avoid the “wastefulness of requiring [duplication of] analyses 
and discovery already made.” 594 F.2d at 597. 
 69. See 8A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2042, at 221 (3d 
ed. 2010). 
 70. “Rule 5(d) embodies a concern that the general public be afforded access to discovery 
materials whenever possible, and that access particularly is appropriate when the subject matter of the 
litigation is of special public interest.” 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1152, at 461–62 n.5 (citing 
In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 71. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 13 & 16. 
 72. See 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1142, at 417–18 (describing the series of changes). 
 73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 74. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (2000) advisory committee note. 
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traditional notion that prelitigation discovery is presumptively open to 
the public. 
The Advisory Committee made extensive comments related to this 
2000 revision, but did not rest their policy choice on privacy interests in 
discovery exchange. Instead, the Advisory Committee explained that 
since the 1980 amendment, several local districts had adopted rules that 
either excused or forbid filing of discovery materials.75 This resulted in a 
multiplicity of filing requirements from district to district.76 Consequently, 
the 2000 amendments were aimed at eliminating inconsistent filing rules in 
different districts.77 In addition to the goal of fostering uniformity of the 
FRCP, this Advisory Committee again focused on considerations of 
expense, burden, and storage capacity to account for this most recent 
change.78 
As mentioned earlier, the Judicial Conference Committees rely on 
the notion that there is no presumptive right of access to discovery not 
filed with the court to justify their opposition the legislation. Opponents 
use a division between filed and unfiled information to justify the 
extension of greater privacy rights to litigating parties. Historically, 
however, the Advisory Committees did not amend the filing rules to 
address privacy concerns. In fact, the current Judicial Conference 
Committees’ position is in conflict with the historical motivations for rule 
changes as explained by the Advisory Committees at the time of those 
revisions. The true motivation for restricted discovery filing requirements 
can be found in a careful review of the revisions and amendments to the 
FRCP over the past several decades. 
B. Misreading SEATTLE TIMES CO. V. RHINEHART 
To strengthen the argument that the Sunshine legislation would 
have minimal effect, Judge Kravitz, on behalf of the Judicial Conference 
Committees, cites to the landmark decision in Seattle Times Co. v. 
Rhinehart.79 Just as he suggested that Rule 5 supported a presumption of 
privacy in discovery, Judge Kravitz suggests that the Supreme Court has 
affirmed the general rule that “what is produced in discovery is not 
public information”80 by quoting a portion of the case. The relevant 
passage in Seattle Times reads as follows: “Moreover, pretrial depositions 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. The 2000 amendment explicitly supersedes and invalidates the local rules. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Hearing, supra note 10, at 59–60 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz) (relying on 
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984)). 
 80. Comments on Additional Language Proposed for H.R. 1508, supra note 23; see also Hearing, 
supra note 10, at 59 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz); see Marcus, supra note 24, at 332 
(arguing that this comment alone should effectively end the debate surrounding public access to 
discovery materials). 
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and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. Such 
proceedings were not open to the public at common law, and, in general, 
they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.”81 At first 
blush, this passage seems relevant to Judge Kravitz’s position, but when 
placed in context, this passage does not support Judge Kravitz’s theory. 
In fact, it undermines it. 
First, the opinion cites to Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, a case dealing 
with the media and a public right of access to criminal pretrial hearings,82 
an issue that is wholly irrelevant to the public right of access to discovery 
exchanged during civil litigation. Second, even if Gannett were relevant, 
as discussed earlier, the FRCP were enacted to expand the scope of 
discovery in direct response to the restrictive common law approach.83 
Citing to the former procedure under common law ignores the critical 
and fundamental purpose of the rules to modernize litigation procedure, 
regardless of the common law approach. Of course, the current scope of 
discovery is more liberal than it was at common law—a chief purpose of 
enacting the FRCP from their inception in 1938.84 
Further, the passage in Seattle Times that supposedly recognizes the 
limits of the public right of access to discovery materials has an extensive 
footnote describing the evolution of the filing requirements for 
discovery. The footnote does not serve to fortify the theory articulated 
by Judge Kravitz. Instead, it bolsters the position this Note takes: that 
discovery is presumptively public, and it is the amendments to the filing 
Rules that have inadvertently undermined this presumption. 
The footnote states that “[d]iscovery rarely takes place in public.”85 
This is indeed the customary practice in modern litigation. Depositions 
and interrogatories are nearly always conducted or answered in private 
settings. However, it is important to distinguish common practice from 
an intentional policy choice. The footnote goes on to say that the “Rules 
of Civil Procedure may require parties to file with the clerk of the court 
interrogatory answers, responses to requests for admissions, and 
deposition transcripts.”86 As discussed earlier, each district was given 
discretion to limit the amount of information filed with the court in 
response to concerns about storage, expense, and discovery abuse 
generally. Hence, while the common practice is inherently private, that 
does not mean it is presumptively so. By ignoring the fundamental 
 
 81. 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (citation omitted) (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389 
(1979)). 
 82. 443 U.S. 368, 370–71 (1979). 
 83. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 6; Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: Non-Party 
Access to Pretrial Information in the Federal Courts 1938–2006, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 817, 828–32 (2007) 
(“The adoption of the FRCP in 1938 marked a new approach and epoch.”). 
 84. Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 828–32.  
 85. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33 n.19. 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
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motivation behind the amendments, it is easy to see how the effect of the 
amendments can be misconstrued. It is true that “the extent that 
courthouse records could serve as a source of public information . . . is 
subject to the control of the trial court,”87 but not because of a policy 
choice to limit public access in favor of privacy concerns.88 This 
interpretation of the amendments to the filing requirements and the 
realities of modern discovery practice must be corrected. 
C. The Effects of Rule 5 Amendments 
The changes to Rule 5 have had an unintended effect that has 
created a significant problem. Rule 5, as amended, is easily manipulated 
to conceal discovery information that ought to be accessible to the 
public. The process of hiding discovery can take many forms, but most 
common and most devious is the secret settlement agreement. 
1. Fashioning Secrecy: How Parties Evade Review 
It is now common practice in modern litigation for parties to agree 
upon settlement conditions requiring confidentiality for certain aspects 
of the agreement.89 In addition to keeping the amount of settlement 
secret, these agreements often require a discovering party to return 
discovery materials to the disclosing party and to remain silent about 
information learned during the prelitigation discovery process.90 Some of 
this information is of vital interest to the public but is no longer 
accessible to the public due to the changes to the filing requirements in 
Rule 5. 
2. Understanding Settlement Agreements 
Conditioned settlement agreements are increasingly implicated in 
litigation that arises when a person is injured, physically or otherwise, by 
the product or practice of another.91 This type of litigation proceeds like 
any other. First, the injured party brings suit to seek redress for an injury 
by asserting general allegations of wrongdoing in the complaint. 
Complaints without merit are dismissed, but all others move forward in 
the litigation process. Even then, most cases do not go all the way to 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Comments on Additional Language Proposed for H.R. 1508, supra note 23; see also Hearing, 
supra note 10, at 59 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz). 
 89. See Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 819 n.8 (describing an attorney who reported that he had not 
entered into a settlement agreement without a confidentiality clause in over five years). 
 90. See Cheit, supra note 37, at 256; Rooks, supra note 16, at 860. But see Reagan et al., supra 
note 29, at 7 (finding that, in general, the only thing kept sealed by the sealing of a settlement 
agreement is the amount of the settlement). 
 91. Of the cases cited in the FJC Report, 503 “were categorized as ones ‘that might be of special 
public interest,’ involving environmental harm, products liability, sexual abuse, and those with a public 
party as defendant.” See Memorandum from the Am. Ass’n for Justice, supra note 35 (quoting 
Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 8 tbl.2). 
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trial.92 Instead, after some discovery is exchanged, parties usually negotiate 
a settlement agreement.93 
The courts encourage settlements. By definition, a settlement is “an 
agreement that ends a dispute and results in the voluntary dismissal of 
any related litigation.”94 Parties are generally permitted to draft the terms 
of settlement agreements without judicial involvement.95 With respect to 
public access to court documents, this is where the system breaks 
down. First, the vast majority of settlement agreements are not filed with 
the court.96 Even if a settlement agreement is filed with the court, it is not 
required to receive scrutiny from the courts. In fact, the court has no 
right to review a settlement agreement unless it is on behalf of a minor, 
incompetent, trustee, or class.97 Because the courts are not permitted to 
review and approve the terms of the agreement, information that can 
pose a significant danger to public health and safety can be easily 
concealed. This restrains the court even if it wants to intervene on behalf 
of the public.98 
If parties could be trusted to place the public interest on par with 
the interest of individual litigants, the Sunshine in Litigation Act would 
not be needed. However, parties are motivated to hide damaging 
information because the cost of widespread repair is perceived as too 
great in comparison to the cost of individual litigation on an ad hoc 
basis.99 In turn, the choice between these two options has the tendency to 
inflate the settlement amount offered to the plaintiff in an individual 
action because silence is seen as a commodity.100 
Even parties who may otherwise wish to expose the dangerous 
practice or product in open litigation proceedings may agree to inflated 
 
 92. See, e.g., Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 1. 
 93. See Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal 
Academia, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 681, 691 & n.43 (2005) (“[L]arge numbers of cases filed in federal 
or state court are now resolved through ADR, and especially settlement.”). See generally John Barkai 
et al., A Profile of Settlement, 42 Ct. Rev.: J. Am. Judges Ass’n 34 (2006). 
 94. Settlement, Legal Information Institute, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/settlement (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 95. See infra note 97. Only settlement agreements under FRCP 23 require court approval. See 
Barkai et al., supra note 93, at 1 (“[A]ccurate empirical data about settlement rates does not exist.”). 
 96. Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 1 (“Usually such agreements are not filed. A high proportion 
of civil cases settle, but a sealed settlement agreement is filed in less than one-half of one percent of 
civil cases.” (footnote omitted)). 
 97. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(A)(1). An action may be voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff 
without a court order if stipulated or sought prior to the defendant’s filing of an answer or motion for 
summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (requiring court approval for settlements on behalf of a 
class); In re Peanut Corp. of Am., No. 6:10CV027, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91402, at *20 (W.D. Va. 
Aug. 25, 2010) (discussing rules related to settlement agreements on behalf of minors). 
 98. Anderson, supra note 16, at 715. 
 99. Interview with Prof. Richard Zitrin, supra note 12; see Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1567–68. 
 100. See Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1565–66 (describing a segment on the television show 60 Minutes 
II). 
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settlement offers partially for the money, but also because it offers 
prompt resolution to an otherwise arduous process.101 When faced with 
the choice between quick settlement and years of litigation, it is simply 
easier for some plaintiffs to choose the speedy and lucrative solution.102 
Thus, in the hands of two private parties that agree to these settlement 
conditions, known dangers to public health and safety can go unchecked 
for years.103 
3. Other Mechanisms Resulting in Secrecy: Protective Orders 
Parties have manipulated other judicial mechanisms to limit 
transparency in the litigation process. Stipulated or umbrella protective 
orders, contracts separate from the settlement agreement created to 
avoid court scrutiny, pseudonyms, sealed documents, and returned or 
destroyed discovery are all tactics that are frequently used to accomplish 
the same end as conditioned settlements.104 As a result of these practices, 
the public often learns about the dangers to public health and safety 
many years, and many victims, after the first suit is brought.105 
Protective orders are by far the most common mechanism used for 
protecting privacy interest and are, therefore, the proper target of 
legislation aimed at regulating secret settlements. Protective orders serve 
a legitimate purpose: The procedural device is in place to “protect a 
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
burden or expense.”106 However, protective orders have also become a 
mechanism for preventing public access to information vital to public 
health and safety. Courts are required to review protective orders before 
they are enforceable.107 Nevertheless, orders undergo far less judicial 
scrutiny when both parties stipulate to them.108 The rationale for the 
limited scrutiny is that if both parties agree to the terms, there is little 
need for an overworked judiciary to interfere.109 This reasoning fails to 
consider the possibility that both parties might have an incentive to 
stipulate to secrecy during the litigation because it can be used as a 
leverage point for settlement agreements.110 Thus, in the interest of 
 
 101. See id. (detailing the story of Kim Van Etten, whose son died in a car accident, and her 
decision to accept a settlement requiring her to keep secret both the amount of settlement and 
documents discovered during litigation). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 1573–75 (detailing media publicity bringing to light secret settlements behind 
Firestone shredding tires, Zomax related deaths, and General Motors, among others). 
 104. See Cheit, supra note 37, at 234, 256. 
 105. Id. at 232–33 (citing examples of tragedies that could have been averted if the defects or 
dangers were available to the public sooner). 
 106. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). 
 107. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 
 108. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 2. 
 109. Id. 
 110. This is also true for settlement agreements. Anderson, supra note 16, at 730–31.  
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reinforcing the courts’ role as a protector of the public interest, all 
protective orders should undergo thorough scrutiny, even when both 
parties stipulate the order. The Sunshine in Litigation Act addresses 
these tactics and gaps in the current procedure. In addition to requiring 
the courts to determine whether issues of public health and safety are 
implicated in settlement agreements, the Act requires a similar inquiry 
before a protective order may be issued.111 The legislation applies to both 
stipulated orders and to those unilaterally requested. 
V.  Why the Sunshine in Litigation Act Is a 
Necessary National Mandate 
It not altogether surprising that when parties’ lawyers are left to 
their own devices, they will often choose secrecy over disclosure in order 
to protect their clients’ interest. This choice is in line with the duty to 
zealously advocate for a client.112 But when no one is watching, people 
tend to make poor choices. The choice to condition settlement upon 
secrecy can have a dramatic impact well beyond the bounds of individual 
litigation, affecting the health and safety of thousands of people. 
The court should play a chief role in the adoption of such 
agreements when matters of concern to public health and safety are 
implicated. The courts took an active role in curbing other forms of 
discovery abuse beginning the 1970s.113 Now, faced with a new form of 
discovery abuse, it is appropriate to look to the courts to guard against 
secrecy abuses too. 
Unfortunately, courts have neither the time nor the inclination to 
review the substantive information that is the basis for secret settlement 
agreements and its potential impact on public health and safety. The 
already demanding workload that most jurisdictions endure precludes 
voluntary adoption of the procedures embodied in the proposed 
legislation.114 Because the courts are not equipped to voluntarily take on 
 
 111. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, S. 537, 111th Cong. § 1660(a)(1)(B)(i) (2009) (“A court 
shall not enter an order under rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure restricting the 
disclosure of information obtained through discovery, an order approving a settlement agreement that 
would restrict the disclosure of such information, or an order restricting access to court records in a 
civil case unless the court has made findings of fact that . . . the public interest in the disclosure of 
potential health or safety hazards is outweighed by a specific and substantial interest in maintaining 
the confidentiality of the information or records in question . . . .”). 
 112. Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1594 (“[A]ttorneys believing it to be in their client’s economic 
interests to enter into a secrecy agreement will simply do so; their perceived duty of advocacy will 
trump any possibility of disclosing . . . .”). 
 113. Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 832 (“Since 1970 . . . [t]he thrust of the amendments to the 
federal rules . . . has been toward containing cost and time expended on the exchange of pretrial 
information.”); see also infra notes 129–34 and accompanying text. 
 114. Alan F. Blaklely, To Squeal or Not to Squeal: Ethical Obligations of Officers of the Court in 
Possession of Information of Public Interest, 34 Cumb. L. Rev. 65, 74 (2003) (“If the parties desire 
confidetiality [sic] and present such a request to the court, what incentive does the court have to 
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more responsibility, the need for legislative reform mandating the 
judiciary to take an active role in the creation and approval of secret 
settlement agreements and protective orders is even more crucial. 
Without mandated intervention, local courts could address this problem 
in myriad ways, with varying levels of scrutiny, resulting in fractured 
outcomes that depend upon the jurisdiction in which the case is tried. 
Thus, in an era of national litigation, forum shopping may become an 
obstacle if the legislation is not implemented at a national level.115 
A. The Rules Governing Discovery 
The legislation properly targets Rule 26(c), the protective order 
provision, to remedy the abuses stemming from changes to the filing 
requirements. Parties with legitimate privacy considerations should 
continue to utilize this Rule to keep discovery information confidential. 
However, parties with improper motives for concealing settlement 
agreements and seeking protective orders must be stopped. 
From the creation of the FRCP in 1938 through the 1970s, the focus 
of the rules governing discovery was on liberalizing discovery 
procedures.116 The rules were crafted with the expansive concepts of 
equity in mind, which resulted in broad discovery practice from the 
outset.117 After 1970, the focus of the rules governing discovery shifted 
“toward containing cost and time expended on the exchange of pretrial 
information.”118 
In addition to amending Rule 5, as described above, the 1970 
amendments also restructured the rules governing discovery in order to 
create one rule addressing the scope of discovery generally.119 This rule 
was designated Rule 26, which had previously governed only 
depositions.120 Prior to the restructuring, the discovery rules were 
separate and self-contained.121 Therefore, any prior amendment made to 
the rules governing discovery occurred on an ad hoc basis and was 
 
analyze the order? . . . Given the busy court dockets and the court’s desire that parties manage their 
own discovery, should courts be expected to add to this duty to their already overburdened load?”). 
 115. Forum shopping occurs when multiple courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s 
claims, and the plaintiff chooses the court that will treat his or her claims most favorably. See Erie R.R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72–76 (1938) (describing litigants in cases with diversity jurisdiction 
moving suits to different federal courts to benefit from the laws of the forum state). 
 116. See Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 831; see also Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American 
Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 Tul. J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 153, 
159–61 (1999). 
 117. See Marcus, supra note 116, at 158. 
 118. Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 832; see also Marcus, supra note 116, at 164–65. 
 119. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 
48 F.R.D. 487, 490 (1970). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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incorporated by reference through other rules.122 Due to the nature and 
complexity of the 1970 amendments, and predictions about future 
amendments, the restructuring was considered a necessary and 
convenient way to organize the rules governing discovery.123 
1. Rule 26(c) Protective Orders 
Particularly relevant to this discussion is Rule 26(c), which governs 
the procedure for obtaining protective orders.124 The Rule “empowers 
the court to make a wide variety of orders for the protection of parties 
and witnesses in the discovery process.”125 The understanding that 
“parties engaged in litigation do not sacrifice all aspects of privacy or 
their proprietary information simply because of a lawsuit” is a strong 
foundation for the Rule.126 “But there remains a concomitant principle 
favoring full, fair, and open disclosure of the important matters occurring 
[in] the public’s courts.”127 These guiding principles are pivotal in 
understanding the essence of Rule 26(c) and its relationship to the other 
discovery rules. In fact, the 1970 Advisory Committee commentary notes 
that changes were made to clarify the Rule and to “avoid any possible 
implication that a protective order . . . may not safeguard against ‘undue 
burden or expense.’”128 
Along with focusing on the added expense and storage of filed 
documents, discovery abuse was a genuine concern in the 1970s.129 In fact, 
the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse was charged 
with examining the FRCP to find ways to “reduce both the excessive cost 
and unnecessary delay” associated with established discovery abuses.130 
With the aim of curbing discovery abuse and controlling time and cost 
expenditures, many amendments have been made over the last few 
decades to the rules governing discovery. 
 
 122. Id. (“From 1938 until the present, a few amendments have applied a discovery provision to 
several rules. For example, in 1948, the scope of deposition discovery in Rule 26(b) and the provision 
for protective orders in Rule 30(b) were incorporated by reference in Rules 33 and 34.”). Protective 
orders are “directly applicable to all forms of discovery.” 8A Wright et al., supra note 69, § 2035, at 
142; see also 12A Wright et al., supra note 58, app. c, at 289. 
 123. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 
48 F.R.D. at 490 (“Proposals of a similar nature will probably be made in the future.”). 
 124. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Prior to 1970, this was codified as Rule 30(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 
(1970) advisory committee note. 
 125. 8A Wright et al., supra note 69, at 141.  
 126. Id. (quoting In re Mirapex Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.R.D. 668, 672–73 (D. Minn. 2007)). 
 127. Id. (quoting Mirapex, 246 F.R.D. at 672–73). 
 128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (1970) advisory committee note. 
 129. The Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse notes several examples of 
“discovery abuse” that prompted their study, including unnecessary discovery, improper withholding 
of discoverable information, and misuse of discovery procedures such as excessively burdensome 
interrogatories. Am. Bar Ass’n, Second Report for the Special Comm. on Abuse of Discovery, 
92 F.R.D. 137, 138, 147 (1980).  
 130. Id. at 137. 
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Beginning in 1983, the Advisory Committee sought to “enhanc[e] 
judicial responsibility to oversee litigation, with special emphasis on 
discovery and sanctions for litigation misconduct.”131 Changes to judicial 
responsibility include requiring discovery conferences, requiring signatures 
on discovery requests, directing judges to curtail disproportionate 
discovery, and permitting judges to order time limits on discovery.132 
Later, in 1993, the FRCP were again amended to reinforce the 
intended restraint on discovery by “impos[ing] numerical limits on 
depositions and interrogatories[,] . . . imposing a moratorium on formal 
discovery until the parties had met and fashioned a discovery 
plan . . . [and creating the] ‘initial disclosure’ duty . . . .”133 But, as with the 
optional Rule 5 amendments of the same era, courts did not have to 
conform to this national scheme thus resulting in a lack of uniformity in 
the application of discovery rules, prompting the 1996 amendments.134 
Notably, all of these revisions to the discovery rules focused on other 
subdivisions. Rule 26(c) has remained relatively the same since the 1970 
revisions. However, new abuses have surfaced that require modification 
of the rule governing protective orders. 
B. Correlating the Changes to Rule 5 with the Rules Governing 
Discovery 
All the changes to discovery procedures were made with the intent 
to control costs and curb discovery abuse. Protective orders remain the 
proper mechanism for protecting privacy interests, but the 2000 
amendment to Rule 5 filing requirements has stifled the purpose of this 
judicial mechanism. Prior to the gradual erosion of the filing 
requirement, the FRCP required, or at least permitted, the filing of a 
variety of discovery materials.135 As such, making secrecy a condition of 
settlement agreements would have served little purpose because the 
damaging information would be on file with the court and readily 
available to the public.136 
Now that the filing requirement has been removed, this barrier has 
been eviscerated, and secret settlements have taken on a whole new 
meaning. Courts are no longer permitted to balance competing interest 
in the discovery context. Because “the [2000] revised Rule [5] prohibits 
 
 131. Marcus, supra note 116, at 162. This was partially triggered by an ABA recommendation to 
narrow discovery. Id.  
 132. See id. at 162. 
 133. Id. at 163. 
 134. Id. at 164. 
 135. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1992); see Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 851 (“The pre-2000 Rule required 
discovery materials to be filed unless exempted by the court . . . .”). 
 136. See Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 838 (discussing pretrial discovery that is often implicated in 
secret settlement agreements). 
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discovery materials from being filed unless they are ‘used in a court 
proceeding,’” it effectively bars the general public from accessing 
information that may be of interest and that would have been publicly 
available—absent a protective order—before the revision.137 
However, even before the amendment, pretrial discovery 
information was not automatically available to third parties, nor could 
such information be used for any purpose. If requested by a party, courts 
considered whether good cause had been shown for a protective order 
under Rule 26(c) in determining the right of access to discovery 
materials.138 Courts were properly charged with balancing the interests of 
parties with legitimate privacy or business concerns against the broader 
public interest in transparency in litigation.139 Unfortunately, the need for 
this analysis has been eliminated by the amendment to Rule 5. Even 
worse, the Judicial Conference Committees have conflated the intent 
behind the filing requirement revisions with the role of Rule 26(c) 
protective orders. This error gives litigants the opportunity to shield 
important information from the public that should remain accessible 
when exchanged between parties. 
Equally damaging, the 2000 amendment to the filing requirement 
gives legitimacy to the Judiciary Conference Committees’ erroneous 
conclusions about the underlying policy choices behind the amendments 
to the filing requirement. Litigants with incentive to shield information 
of interest to public health and safety will point to the now limited public 
access to discovery documents to support a presumption of privacy. 
While there may be legitimate reasons for limiting public access to the 
materials exchanged during discovery, the discussion should be based 
upon the true motivations of the drafting Advisory Committees and not 
a mistaken assumption. The notion that there is a policy restricting public 
access to discovery has no place in the debate. 
C. The Scope of the Legislation 
As a basic premise, parties to litigation are limited to resolving a 
controversy personal to them and are not permitted to litigate on behalf 
of the public at large, or even known third parties. Unless the plaintiff 
meets the constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and 
 
 137. Id. at 851 (quoting 1 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 5.33[2] (3d ed. 1997)). 
Technological advancements in the storage of electronic data nullify some of the storage and burden 
arguments used to support the revision to Rule 5. See id. at 876–77 (“Electronic filing improves judge, 
court staff, and public access to case files; decreases court costs through increased productivity and 
efficiency; reduces physical handling, maintenance, and copying of files; improves docketing, 
scheduling, case management, and statistical reporting; and enhances accuracy and efficiency in record 
maintenance.”). 
 138. Fed. R Civ. P. 26(c); Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 856. 
 139. Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 856. 
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redressability, or has a “close relationship” to right holder, and the third 
party right holder is unable to assert his or her own rights, the plaintiff 
cannot properly present grievances to the court.140 This Note does not 
advocate for an expansion of the standing doctrine so that parties may 
litigate on behalf of others who are similarly situated. Individuals injured 
at the hands of another deserve their own redress, and the judicial 
process will adequately resolve disputes between parties on a micro-
level. Rather, this Note argues in favor of removing some of the barriers 
to transparency in the pretrial litigation process. The restoration of 
mechanisms no longer in place will help potential litigants assert their 
rights more efficiently when they have been wronged through deliberate 
acts to conceal information relevant to public health and safety. 
Moreover, defining the scope of information relevant to public 
health and safety in this context is simpler than some legal commentators 
make it out to be.141 The scope of the information can be equated to the 
legal principle used when determining whether or not something is 
“material” to a person’s decisionmaking process.142 Essentially, any 
information about a dangerous product or practice that would affect an 
individual’s choice, consumer or otherwise, because it poses a risk to 
their health and well-being satisfies the criteria for implicating public 
health and safety. The public has an unavoidable right to access this 
information as soon as it is exchanged in discovery, and no private 
agreement between litigating parties can or should be permitted to trump 
that basic power without demonstrating a significant reason to overcome 
it. Assuming this public right of access can be overcome, the need for 
privacy for individual litigants can be accommodated while still disclosing 
pertinent information to the public at-large. Accordingly, any settlement 
conditioned on the return of discovery materials and a vow of silence 
from the plaintiff should be closely scrutinized by the court to ensure that 
 
 140. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414–16 (1991) (holding that requirements were satisfied to 
establish third-party standing to protect equal protection rights of potential jurors, and not those of the 
defendant, where prosecutors use peremptory challenges based upon race); Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (addressing who has standing to challenge prosecutors that use peremptory 
challenges based on race); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 196–97 (1976) (holding that beer vendors had 
standing to sue on behalf of eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old males prohibited from purchasing beer); 
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259–60 (1953). But see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 
(1973) (establishing that rights of hypothetical third parties may be asserted if law restricting speech is 
substantially overbroad); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614–16 (1971) (holding that picketers in a 
labor dispute who were arrested under a misdemeanor ordinance prohibiting “blocking sidewalks” 
were allowed to bring a facial challenge against the ordinance). 
 141. Marcus, supra note 13, at 20–21 (arguing that problems exist in determining when to apply 
closer scrutiny). 
 142. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “material” as: “Of such a nature that knowledge of the item 
would affect a person’s decision-making; significant; essential.” Black’s Law Dictionary 450 (3d 
pocket ed. 2006).  
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the judiciary is actively fulfilling its duty to the public interest as a whole, 
as well as to the individual litigants involved. 
Even more important than remedying past concealment of dangers 
to public health and safety, the proposed legislation regulating settlement 
agreements and protective orders prevents these conditioned agreements 
from ever occurring in the first place. By eliminating the opportunity to 
enter into settlement agreements that allow litigants to bargain for 
silence surrounding a known danger, accountability will more or less be 
mandated for defendants once they become aware of a problem. Not 
only will they be liable for past wrongs, but also the public will demand 
that a known danger be corrected. Defendants will be forced to redress 
their wrongs, or risk that the public will abandon their product or 
practice in protest of their deception and/or complacency with an inferior 
product or injurious practice. 
Conclusion 
Proponents of restricted access to discovery materials rely upon the 
incorrect assumption that discovery is inherently private. This Note 
makes clear that restricted access to pretrial discovery has been an 
unintended consequence of amendments made to the FRCP since the 
1970s and is not part of a larger scheme to shield discovery information 
from public view. Instead, information exchanged during pretrial 
discovery, whether filed or not, is presumptively public and should only 
be sealed upon proper showing from the parties. The Sunshine in 
Litigation Act addresses this problem and helps to restore the public’s 
right of access to information exchanged during discovery.  
 
